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ABSTRACT
Renewable sources are taking center stage in electricity generation.
However, matching supply with demand in a renewable-rich sys-
tem is a dicult task due to the intermient nature of renewable
resources (wind, solar, etc.). As a result, Demand Response (DR)
programs are an essential part of the modern grid. An ecient
DR technique is to devise dierent pricing schemes that encourage
customers to reduce or shi the electric load.
In this paper, we consider a market model for DR using Block
Rate Pricing (BRP) of two blocks. We use a utility maximization
approach in a competitive market. We show that when customers
are price taking and the utility cost function is quadratic the result-
ing system achieves an equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium is
unique and ecient, which maximizes social welfare. A distributed
algorithm is proposed to nd the optimal pricing of both blocks
and the load. Both the customers and the utility runs the market.
e proposed scheme encourages customers to curtail or shi their
load. Numerical results are presented to validate our technique.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many countries have plans to shi to renewable sources of electric-
ity by 2050 [6, 12]. is is mainly due the environmental and cost
related problems with the fossil fuel based power plants. While
renewable sources (such as solar and wind) provide an environment
friendly solution to the energy demand, they also create challenges
in the electricity distribution system. e problems mostly origi-
nate from the variable and stochastic nature of renewable sources
which produces a mismatch between the demand and supply of
electricity [9].
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With the current penetration level of renewable resources, util-
ities use dierent approaches to handle the demand and supply
gap. Most commonly used methods include fossil fuel based peaker
power plants [15] and Demand side management (DSM) techniques
such as Demand Response (DR), spinning reserve, electricity stor-
age [10, 13] and electricity curtailment [1].
Electricity storage methods and peaker power plants are very
costly to operate, while electricity curtailment has negative impact
on the life style of customers. DR programs are the most eective
way to match demand with supply. Based on the techniques used to
encourage customers to reduce or shi their load, DR programs are
broadly divided into two categories [15]. (1) Price based programs
use dierent pricing schemes (2) Incentive based programs use
nancial or other benet to enroll customers in the DR programs.
e price based DR programs consist of
(1) Flat Pricing: Fixed price per unit of electricity
(2) Block Rate Pricing (BRP): Flat price but changes under dif-
ferent usage (blocks) of electricity
(3) Time of Use Pricing (TOU): Flat price during dierent time
periods of the day
(4) Critical Peak Pricing (CPP): Price is not at and can changes
under dierent system conditions
(5) Real Time Pricing (RTP): Price changes in each time inter-
vals
In this paper, we use BRP as a DR program to motivate customers
to reduce or shi their load. In BRP there is a threshold of electricity,
the price per unit increases or decreases as electricity consumption
increases beyond the threshold (blocks). is can discourage or
encourage customers to use less or more electricity [4]. We consider
a situation in which the power supply is exible and there are two
blocks of BRP. e consumers maximize their net utility over the
whole day. It is proved that under BRP and quadratic cost function
the system achieve equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. A
distributed algorithm is proposed to nd the equilibrium. e
implementation of proposed distributed algorithm requires twoway
communication between the utility company and the customers.
Such kind of communication is possible with Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI).
e paper is organized as follow. Literature review is presented
in section 2. In section 3 utility maximization problem is formu-
lated under BRP. Distributed algorithm and numerical results are
presented in section 4. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
A large number of related literature exists on DR and dierent
market models for the power system. In this section, we discuss
the work that is related to our approach.
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In [5] two market models for demand matching and demand
shaping are presented. e equilibrium of these models is studied
under competitive and oligopolistic situations and distributed algo-
rithms are presented for their solution. Similarly, in [16] a demand
response solution based on utility maximization using TOU pricing
is derived. e eect of TOU pricing in power system with plug-in
hybrid electric vehicle is studied in [14] and it is concluded that
TOU price is an eective method to reduce the peak demand. An
extensive study of dierent pricing methods on residential users
is presented in [11]. e data suggests the CPP along with auto-
matic curtailment is a good DR technique. However, it can cause
serious hardships for consumers. A real time pricing model under
many distributed generation units is proposed in [7]. A distributed
algorithm is also presented that can solve the problem. e eect
of BRP on residential customers in chine is studied in [8] and some
interesting ndings are reported. e BRP will substantially im-
prove the equity and eciency of residential customers. Secondly
the BRP the electricity consumption of residential customers will
be reduced, which results in the reduction of carbon emission.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a power system with a set N of users/customers and a
set T of time slots in a day. ese customers are served by one
power company. For each customer i ∈ N and t ∈ T there is
a power consumption denoted by xti . Moreover, each customer
has a minimum and maximum power consumption in a day. e
minimum power consumption corresponds to basic requirements
over the whole day and maximum power consumption corresponds
to all equipment running the whole day.
T∑
t=1
xti ≥ Dmini , i ∈ N (1)
T∑
t=1
xti ≤ Dmaxi , i ∈ N (2)
We consider BRP with two blocks, the pricing of rst and the sec-
ond block is represented by P tl and P
t
l respectively. For every time
t there is a predened threshold bt . When electricity consumption
is increased beyond the threshold bt the electricity price increases
or decreases step wise.
P t =
{
P tl if 0 ≤ xti ≤ bt
P tu if bt ≤ xti
(3)
Aer consuming xti power each user obtains a utilityU (xti ), which
represents the level of satisfaction of a user as a function of power.
e utility function should be non-decreasing and concave such
that zero utility corresponds to zeros power consumption [5]. We
can write xti into two parts such that one is equal to and less than
bt and the other is greater than or equal to bt .
xti = min(xti ,bt ) +max(xti ,bt ) − bt (4)
e power company incurs a cost C(D, t) for providing D demand
at time t . e cost function is ideal to model time dependent power
production such as renewable energy resources. We assume that
the cost function is quadratic in D.
e goal of power company is to maximize its net revenue.
Which is prot minus cost.e prot and cost for a single time
slot t are given below.
Pro f it = P tl ∗
∑
i ∈N
min(xti ,bt ) + P tu ∗
∑
i ∈N
(max(xti ,bt ) − bt ) (5)
Cost = C
( ∑
i ∈N
min(xti ,bt ) +
∑
i ∈N
(max(xti ,bt ) − bt ), t
)
(6)
We can replace min and max functions with dummy variables by
adding additional constraints [3].
min(xti ,bt ) = yti
subject to: yti ≤ xti ; yti ≤ bt
(7)
max(xti ,bt ) = zti
subject to: zti ≥ xti ; zti ≥ bt
(8)
By using the above variables we can write xti as
xti = y
t
i + z
t
i − bt ; i ∈ N , t ∈ T (9)
Using yti and z
t
i the above net revenue problem becomes.
Maximize:
yti ≤x ti
yti ≤bt
zti ≥x ti
zti ≥bt
x ti ≥0
x ti =y
t
i +z
t
i −bt
∑
t ∈T
(
P tl
∑
i ∈N
yti + P
t
u
∑
i ∈N
(zti − bt ) −C(
∑
i ∈N
(yti + zti − bt ), t)
)
(10)
By taking partial derivatives the solution of above problem becomes.
P tl =
∂C(∑i ∈N (yti + zti − bt ), t)
∂(∑i ∈N yti ) ; t ∈ T (11)
P tu =
∂C(∑i ∈N (yti + zti − bt ), t)
∂(∑i ∈N zti ) ; t ∈ T (12)
3.1 Utility Maximization
In this section we consider a competitive market where customers
take the price communicated by power company. For real time
block rate pricing P tl and P
t
u the customer i allocates its energy
usage to maximize its aggregated net utility,along with constraints
(1) and (2).
Maximize:
x ti ≥0
∑
t ∈T
(
U (xti ) − P tl min(xti ,bt ) + P tu (max(xti ,bt ) − bt )
)
Subject to:
T∑
t=1
xti ≥ Dmini
T∑
t=1
xti ≤ Dmaxi
(13)
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Using the (7), (8) and (9) the above problem can be transformed into
Maximize:
yti ≤x ti
yti ≤bt
zti ≥x ti
zti ≥bt
x ti ≥0
x ti =y
t
i +z
t
i −bt
∑
t ∈T
(
U (yti + zti − bt ) − P tl yti − P tu (zti − bt )
)
Subject to:
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) ≥ Dmini
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) ≤ Dmaxi
(14)
e above model captures both the real time block rate pricing
and demand shiing. e sum over the t enforce the demand
shiing. e solution of above problem is the equilibrium of the
competitive market problem (14). We can nd the equilibrium using
the Lagrange dual function by using Lagrange multipliers λ1i ≥ 0
and λ2i ≥ 0 for constraints in (14) . e optimal yti and zti are given
below by following KKT conditions [3].
∂U (yti + zti − bt , t)
∂yti
− P tl − λ1i + λ2i = 0; i ∈ N , t ∈ T
∂U (yti + zti − bt , t)
∂zti
− P tu − λ1i + λ2i = 0; i ∈ N , t ∈ T
λ1i (
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) − Dmaxi = 0); i ∈ N
λ2i (Dmini −
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) = 0); i ∈ N
(15)
A competitive equilibrium for demand response system is a system
of equations that simultaneously solves (11), (12) and (15). e equi-
librium consists of variables {yti , zti , P tl , P tu } that solves equations
(11), (12) and (15) simultaneously.
Theorem 3.1. ere is a unique equilibrium for a competitive
demand response system under block rate pricing. Moreover, the
equilibrium maximizes the social welfare.
Maximize:
yti ≤x ti
yti ≤bt
zti ≥x ti
zti ≥bt
x ti ≥0
x ti =y
t
i +z
t
i −bt
∑
t ∈T
( ∑
i ∈N
U (yti + zti − bt ) −C(
∑
i ∈N
(yti + zti − bt ), t)
)
Subject to:
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) ≥ Dmini , i ∈ N
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) ≤ Dmaxi , i ∈ N
(16)
Proof. We have assumed that our cost function is quadratic,
under this assumption ∂C(
∑
i∈N (yti +zti −bt ))
∂(∑i∈N yti ) = ∂C(
∑
i∈N (yti +zti −bt ))
∂yti
.
Using this fact if we put 11 and 12 into 15, we get the equilib-
rium condition for the social welfare problem 16. Moreover the
equilibrium is unique since the problem 16 is strictly convex.
∂U (yti + zti − bt )
∂yti
− ∂C(
∑
i ∈N (yti + zti − bt ))
∂yti
− λ1i + λ2i = 0;
∂U (yti + zti − bt )
∂zti
− ∂C(
∑
i ∈N (yti + zti − bt ))
∂zti
− λ1i + λ2i = 0;
λ1i (
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) − Dmaxi = 0); i ∈ N
λ2i (Dmini −
T∑
t=1
(yti + zti − bt ) = 0); i ∈ N
(17)

4 DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM AND
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we rst propose a distributed algorithm to nd
the equilibrium and then we present the results that show the
convergence of algorithm to optimal pricing and customers demand.
4.1 Distributed Algorithm
e social welfare optimization problem 16 can be solved in a
distributed and iterative way using gradient based algorithm [2].
We assume that the bracket interval bt are already dened and
communicated to the users. e whole procedure repeats for every
time step.
At the start of kth iteration
• e utility company communicates to each user and re-
ceives the demand data (xt+1i )k for the next time slot t + 1.
Using bt+1 and (xt+1i )k , the utility company computes
(yt+1i )k , (zt+1i )k
• Using (yt+1i )k , (zt+1i )k the utility company computes prices
for both brackets and communicate them to users
(P t+1l )k =
∂C(∑i ∈N ((yt+1i )k + (zt+1i )k − bt+1), t)
∂(∑i ∈N (yt+1i )k ) (18)
(P t+1u )k =
∂C(∑i ∈N ((yt+1i )k + (zt+1i )k − bt+1), t)
∂(∑i ∈N (zt+1i )k ) (19)
• Aer receiving the price each user i update its demand
using gradient based method [2].
(yt+1i )k+1 = [(yt+1i )k+γ (
∂U ((yt+1i )k + (zt+1i )k − bt+1
∂(yt+1i )k
)−(P t+1l )k )]si
(20)
(zt+1i )k+1 = [(zt+1i )k+γ (
∂U ((yt+1i )k + (zt+1i )k − bt+1
∂(zt+1i )k
)−(P t+1u )k )]si
(21)
Where γ > 0 is a constant step size used in gradient methods
[2]. e set si represents the projection on the constraints given by
1,2, 7, 8 and 9. is operation can be easily performed by the users
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Figure 1: Eect of γ on the convergence of algorithm for β2 > β1 (a) γ = 0.01 (b) γ = 0.1 (c) γ = 0.3
since all these constraints are of same user. Since the problem is
convex, it converges for small γ . e whole algorithm repeats for
each time step t . Both the power company and users jointly run
the market under BRP.
4.2 Numerical Example
We consider a simple numerical example of two customers(N = 2),
with bt = 25. w utility function used is given in eq 22, where
wi ∈ [10 − 100] and α = 1. We consider a step wise quadratic cost
function, Where the cost changes aer providing rst bt ∗ N units
of electricity. If the cost increases it discourages customers to use
less electricity and P tu > P tl . Similarly, if the cost of production
decreases it encourages customers to use more electricity and P tl >
P tu . is cost function is more generic since there is a base power
fullled by one set of generation units and as the demand increases
the utility runs additional generation units with dierent cost. e
cost function is given in eq 23.
U (xti ) =
{
wix
t
i − α(xti )2 if 0 ≤ xti ≤ wiα
w2i
2α if
wi
α ≤ xti
(22)
C(D) =
{
β1D2 if 0 ≤ D ≤ btN
β2D2 if D > btN
(23)
Figure 1 shows the eect of dierent γ on the convergence of
algorithm, with β2 > β1. As γ increases the algorithm started to
converge in less iterations. Since β2 > β1 the price of second block
is greater than the price of rst block (Pu > Pl ).
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we formulate a DR program under block rate pricing
with two blocks. We consider a competitive market where users
try to maximize their net utility and the power company try to
maximize the net revenue. It is proved that under block rate pricing
and quadratic cost function, the system achieves an equilibrium,
which is unique and ecient. We propose a distributed algorithm
to compute the equilibrium. e numerical results demonstrate
that the distributed algorithm can eciently compute the pricing
of both blocks.
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